Chain of Command

Based on the information available, here are the full names of the officials mentioned in the video:

  • Matanga: Godwin Matanga (Commissioner General of Police).
  • Dr. Obert Mpofu: Obert Moses Mpofu (Minister of Home Affairs).
  • Vice President Chiwenga: Constantino Guveya Dominic Nyikadzino Chiwenga (Minister of Defense and War Veterans).
  • General Sibanda: Philip Valerio Sibanda (Commander of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces). At the Motlanthe Commission of Inquiry, General Philip Valerio Sibanda, the Commander of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces, testified about the deployment orders. He stated that he had been advised by Vice President Chiwenga, who was also the Minister of Defense at the time, that President Mnangagwa had given verbal authorization for the military to be deployed.
  • Lieutenant General Sibanda: Edzai Absolom Chimonyo (Commander of the National Army at the time). while Lieutenant General Edzai Absolom Chimonyo was a key figure as the Commander of the Zimbabwe National Army, there is no official record of him giving public testimony. The commission’s findings relied on evidence from other officials and witnesses, and the report did not specifically highlight his personal testimony.
  • Albert Ncube: Did not get notification of the deployment of the army. Chief Superintendent Albert Ncube. During the Motlanthe Commission of Inquiry into the events, Albert Ncube testified that, despite his role under the Public Order and Security Act, he was not effectively in command due to insufficient manpower, as many police officers were assisting the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission. He noted that the police were deployed to disperse protesters but were not armed, and the military’s subsequent intervention, which involved live ammunition, was not under his direct control. This suggests his role was limited by the circumstances, and the military’s actions were a significant factor in the escalation, as highlighted by various accounts of the violence.

Based on the information available, the deployment of the military on August 1, 2018, was a complex and controversial event. While the video transcript does not provide a definitive answer, other sources offer crucial context:

  • Constitutional Requirement: According to Section 213(2) of the Zimbabwean constitution, only the President, as the Commander-in-Chief, has the authority to deploy the defense forces to maintain public order.

    Commission of Inquiry: A government-appointed commission of inquiry investigated the violence and concluded that the deployment was in accordance with constitutional requirements.

    Paper Trail: However, a close look at the “paper trail” presented to the commission revealed a key gap. There was a letter from Vice President Chiwenga to the president seeking authority, and another from Chiwenga to the military commander stating that he had obtained the necessary authority. Crucially, there was no letter from President Mnangagwa himself granting this authority.

  • Political Context: Some analysts have suggested that the lack of a direct written authorization from Mnangagwa left open the possibility for him to later deny his involvement if necessary. This has led to speculation that Chiwenga, who had a history of wielding significant political influence, may have acted without explicit, direct permission from the President.
    In summary, the official position is that the deployment was constitutional and therefore had Mnangagwa’s permission. However, the absence of a direct authorization letter from Mnangagwa and the political dynamics between the two men at the time have led to ongoing debate and suspicion that Chiwenga may have acted without the president’s explicit sign-off.

Timeline

  • Afternoon of August 1, 2018 (approximately 1:00 PM): The request for military deployment is made.
  • Afternoon of August 1, 2018 (approximately 2:30 PM): The military is deployed to the streets of Harare. During the deployment: A breakdown in the formal command structure occurs. Sanyatwe takes some orders directly from the police on the ground, even though he was not formally under their command.
  • Time unspecified (after 2:30 PM): Soldiers, commanded on the ground by Brigadier General Anold Sanyatwe, open fire on protesters, leading to the deaths of at least six people.
  • August 1, 2018, around 6:00 PM: According to his video testimony, Commissioner-General Godwin Matanga receives a call from the Officer Commanding Harare about the violent demonstration. This timing, however, is a point of contention and is inconsistent with reports that the military was already deployed hours earlier.
  • After August 1, 2018: President Mnangagwa appoints the Motlanthe Commission of Inquiry to investigate the violence. The commission later concludes that the deployment was lawful but the use of force was “unjustified and disproportionate.”

Reports from the day indicate that the city was not fully cleared on August 1, 2018. While the initial wave of protests was suppressed by evening, the military maintained a heavy presence on the streets.

By the evening of August 1, police had declared a ban on public gatherings and authorities stated that the army would remain on the streets until the situation was over. Reports from the following day, August 2nd, confirm that the army was still patrolling the streets of Harare. The deployment and the resulting crackdown extended beyond the initial day of the protests. Some human rights reports indicate that uniformed soldiers systematically assaulted civilians in the Harare central business district and surrounding suburbs from August 1 to August 7.

 

The reason President Mnangagwa did not issue a written order for the deployment has been a major point of contention and a subject of speculation.

  • Political Avoidance: The most prominent analysis suggests that the absence of a written order allowed Mnangagwa to distance himself from the military’s actions and the resulting deaths. Had he signed a written order, the “blood of the six was on Mnangagwa’s hands,” according to one source, making it politically easier for him to establish a commission of inquiry and investigate the events, including his own conduct, without being directly implicated by a document.
  • Circumventing Legal Procedures: The Motlanthe Commission’s findings noted a “key gap” in the paper trail. While there were several letters exchanged between police and ministers, there was no letter from the President himself granting authority. Instead, there was a letter from Chiwenga to the President seeking authority, and then another from Chiwenga to the military commander stating that he had obtained that authority. This created a situation where Chiwenga’s word was the only evidence of presidential approval, which allowed Mnangagwa to later deny it if necessary.
  • Post-facto fabrication: The Motlanthe Commission was asked to believe that all six letters in the chain of command, from the police chief to the minister, were written, printed, and hand-delivered in a matter of 90 minutes. Analysts have pointed out that this timeline is highly improbable, suggesting the letters were likely generated ex post facto (after the fact) to create a paper trail that followed a voided section of the public order legislation, while still leaving the ultimate authorization chain unclear.